J'Accuse!

Emile Zola’s open letter published on the front page of L’Aurore on 13 January 1898 has become the epitomic expression for denouncing State lies.  This expression fits perfectly to denounce the French Republic for sacrificing truth in the name of raison d’État in the Al-Dura Affair.  In February 2004, French President Jacques Chirac sent a letter to Charles Enderlin, the author of the Al-Dura report, praising his faithfulness to truth.  In 2008, French journalists published an open letter to express their support for Charles Enderlin.  In 2009, President Sarkozy granted Enderlin the légion d’honneur, France’s highest decoration.  The French State has behaved in the Al-Dura Affair the way it behaved in the Dreyfus Affair –except for the fact that in the Dreyfus Affair, the State eventually admitted that it had orchestrated a lie.  And during the Dreyfus Affair, many French “intellectuels” (the word was coined at the time) took personal risks in the name of truth.  In the Al-Dura Affair, by contrast, most French journalists and public figures have circled the wagons around Enderlin. 

The behavior of the French establishment in the Al-Dura affair is shameful, but not surprising.  What is surprising is the fact that the Israeli establishment also circled the wagons around Enderlin.    

The “Affair” started on September 30, 2000, when French state television France 2 broadcast images showing a boy and his father (Mohammad and Jamal Al-Dura) supposedly caught in gunfire between the IDF and PA forces at Gaza’s Netzarim junction.  France 2’s Israel correspondent Charles Enderlin did not personally witness the incident but he claimed, while commenting on the images filmed by his Palestinian cameraman Talal Abu-Rahmah, that the boy had been intentionally killed by Israeli bullets.  Enderlin’s words were that the boy and his father were the target (“la cible” in French) of the IDF.  The message was clear: the IDF had intentionally killed a helpless Palestinian child (Enderlin later claimed that he hadn’t meant that Israel intentionally killed the child, but that is nevertheless what could unmistakably be understood from his words).     

In 2004, France 2 sued French politician and media analyst Philippe Karsenty for claiming that Enderlin’s report was a forgery.  In 2008, the Paris Appellate Court acquitted Karsenty of defamation, concluding that the defendant had grounds for questioning the authenticity of Enderlin’s report.  France 2 appealed to France’s highest court, and a final verdict is expected next month.    

The images broadcast by France 2 and Enderlin’s claim had a devastating effect.  They inflamed the “Second Intifada” as well as anti-Israel demonstrations around the world.  Horrendous crimes such as the lynching of Israeli soldiers in Ramallah in October 2000 or the beheading of Daniel Pearl in February 2002 were justified by their perpetuators as a revenge for Mohammad Al-Dura’s death.

And yet, Mohammad Al-Dura could not possibly have been killed by Israeli bullets.  Worse, there is strong evidence that the whole scene might have been staged in the first place.  Which means that Charles Enderlin and France 2 are responsible for a blood libel that caused the death of hundreds of Jews and that had devastating consequences on Israel’s international image. 

On 19 May 2013, the Israeli Government published a report that demonstrates the inconsistencies and falsehoods of Enderlin’s claim (the Government’s study can be downloaded here).  Why it took nearly thirteen years for the Israeli Government to react to Enderlin’s accusation is an intriguing question that will be addressed at the end of this article.

The Israeli Government’s report is based, among others, on previous studies and inquiries, including those of abovementioned Philippe Karsenty (whose presentation can be watched here), of German journalist Esther Schapira (whose documentary can be watched here), of American History Professor Richard Landes (whose analysis can be watched here), of Israel ballistic expert Nahum Shahaf, of French ballistic expert Jean-Claude Shlinger, and of French-born Israeli surgeon Yehuda David.  The commission established by the Israeli government concludes that Enderlin’s accusation is baseless. There is nothing to support the claim that Muhammad and Jamal Al-Dura were “targets of gunfire from the Israeli position.” Indeed, nothing in the video supports the claim that they were hit by any gunfire.

Enderlin committed a grave professional mistake at best and an act of felony at worst by relying entirely on Abu Rahmah’s unsubstantiated claim that the boy had been killed by Israeli bullets.  Indeed, CNN refused to air Enderlin’s report (which France 2, for some reason, gave out for free) precisely because its central claim was not confirmed by the images and were only based on the sayings of Abu Rahmah, himself a Palestinian militant who has declared that he became a journalist “to promote the Palestinian cause.”

The Israeli government and the IDF have asked many times to receive the full and unedited footage filmed by Abu-Rahmah.  France 2, Charles Enderlin and their lawyers have consistently refused to hand the entire raw footage to Israel (only part of it was submitted to Court in France because the Judges demanded it).   Right after the broadcast of Enderlin’s report, the IDF Spokesman asked for the full raw footage (27 minutes according to Abu-Rahmah), but was only given a tape which contained basically the same footage that had already been aired.   France 2 has also turned down similar requests by the Commander of the Southern Command and by the Prime Minister’s Office.  Between September and November 2007 the IDF Spokesperson and Deputy Spokesperson repeatedly requested the unedited footage from France 2’s lawyers, but to no avail.  France 2 wouldn’t refuse to produce the entire raw footage if it didn’t have anything to hide.

CRIF, the representative council of French Jewry, has been asking for years for a professional inquiry into the Al-Dura Affair.  In 2008, France 2 accepted to set-up an independent and international commission, but then it backed down.   

But the most troubling part of the Al-Dura affair is that it took over twelve years for Israel to officially deny Enderlin’s claims.

Charles Enderlin is a Franco-Israeli journalist who moved to Israel in the late 1960s and started working for French TV channel Antenne 2 (today’s France 2) in the early 1980s.  He defines himself as “a Zionist up to the green line” and openly identifies with the Israeli Left.  He has many friends in Israel’s political and media establishments.  When the Al-Dura affair erupted, Enderlin could –and did- count on those friends. 

After the failure of the Camp David Summit in July 2000, Enderlin became personally involved in further attempts to reach an agreement between Israel and the PA.  He offered his help to his friend Gilead Sher, who was Israel’s co-chief peace negotiator in 1999-2001.  Today, Sher is Enderlin’s lawyer. 

Since 2000, Enderlin’s line of defense has been that the Israeli government never officially contested his report and never accused him of forgery.  He had a point, but then there was a reason why the Israeli government never accused Enderlin of forgery.  Enderlin has many friends at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), in the IDF, and in the Israeli media.  Prominent among them are former Israeli ambassadors to France Nissim Zvili and Danny Shiek, Israeli politicians Tzipi Livni and Israel Hasson, and Israeli journalists Gideon Levy and Daniel Bensimon. 

Since 2000, the official position of the MFA and of the IDF was that it was preferable not to talk about Al-Dura (Gideon Meir was, and still is, a fierce defender of this theory on behalf of the MFA).    The MFA’s spokesman Yigal Palmor declared that “The [Israeli] government does not have an official stand as to what exactly happened on September 30, 2000 at Netzarim and sees the issue as an internal French affair, not Israeli” and that “Karsenty’s work is counterproductive.”

Enderlin could use his contacts at the MFA, at the IDF, and in the Israeli media to keep Israel quiet, but he had no such leverage on Moshe Yaalon, who was appointed Minister of Strategic Affairs in 2009. 

It is the Ministry of Strategic Affairs that issued Israel’s official rebuttal of Enderlin in May 2013.  So now Enderlin can no longer claim that Israel does not dispute his accusation of murdering Mohammad Al-Dura.  What was Enderlin’s reaction to Israel’s official rebuttal? To threaten to sue Moshe Yaalon!  And who sent this threatening letter to Yaalon on May 28, 2013?  Gilead Sher’s law firm.        

On the one hand, Enderlin has been blaming the lack of official rebuttal of his theory on the Israeli government’s silence (a silence which he was instrumental in preserving).  On the other hand, now that the Israeli government finally rebutted his theory, Enderlin is threatening to sue.  This bullying and intimidation are reminiscent of the way France 2 and Charles Enderlin “convinced” the ARTE TV channel not to air Esther Schapira’s documentary on the Al-Dura affair.    

J’accuse senior MFA and IDF officials as well as major Israeli journalists, because their cover-up of Enderlin was cowardly and criminal.

The official MFA/IDF/Ha’aretz et al. claim that ignoring the whole story and letting it fade away was preferable to fighting for Israel’s reputation was, and still is, moronic, hypocritical, and wrong.  Why should we let ourselves be accused of intentionally murdering a helpless child?  Why?  As for the “let it fade away” theory, it has been constantly contradicted by facts: until today (and, indeed, until the publication of the Israeli rebuttal last month), the Al-Dura myth is pervasive in the Arab world.  Jamal Al-Dura tours the world as a hero, monuments keep being dedicated to the memory of Muhammad Al-Dura, children are taught in school about “the hero Muhammad Al-Dura,” and in March 2012 the perpetuator of the Toulouse massacre justified his murder as a revenge for the killing of Palestinian children in Gaza.  So how, exactly, did Al-Dura fade away?           

Prof. Shmuel Trigano wrote recently that the Al-Dura affair is the Dreyfus Affair of anti-Zionism.  I beg to differ: the Al-Dura affair is rather remindful of “The Saison” (i.e. the collaboration between the Jewish Agency and the British Mandate against Irgun fighters) and the Altalena (i.e. putting the monopoly of power before Jewish lives).

Enderlin’s Israeli defenders should be ashamed of themselves.  They are a disgrace. 

Is Netanyahu “Sharonizing”?

The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), a leading Israeli think tank, recently hosted its annual conference.  This year, the conference’s main agenda was to promote the idea of unilateral disengagement from Judea and Samaria.  INSS’s suggestions were summarized in a paper authored by Gilead Sher and his team: “The Palestinian Issue: Toward a Reality of Two States.”  Unilateralism is not the authors’ favorite option: such a strategy, they claim, should only be implemented if and when the Palestinian Authority rejects another Israeli peace offer –an offer that should be based on Olmert’s proposal to Mahmud Abbas in 2008.

None of the new government’s coalition partners are ready to endorse the Olmert proposal.  Even Tzipi Livni (a minority partner in the current government) criticized Olmert’s proposal while she was serving as his Foreign Minister, because she disagreed with Olmert on the refugee issue.  Yair Lapid has said that Olmert went too far with his proposal to Abbas.  For Likud, Israel Beitenu and the Jewish Home, the Olmert proposal is a non-starter.  So expecting the newly elected Israeli government to resubmit the Olmert proposal to Abbas is not only unrealistic but also strange: why should the government implement a policy for which it was not elected and which was rejected at the polls?

For the record, the Olmert proposal consisted of an Israeli withdrawal from 94% of Judea and Samaria (with minor land swaps); of a safe passage route from Hebron to the Gaza Strip; of the forced evacuation of tens of thousands of Israelis (including from Hebron, Ofra, and Bet-El); of the transfer of sovereignty over Jerusalem’s “holy basin” (including the Temple Mount and the Western Wall) from Israel to an international custodial regime composed of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian State; and of the acceptance by Israel of the return of 5,000 Palestinian refugees to Israel proper, with financial compensation for the rest. 

But suppose, for the sake of the argument, that Olmert was Prime Minister again and that his coalition was backing him on the 2008 proposal.  Would Abbas, this time, accept it?  One theory (promoted among others by Israeli journalist Raviv Drucker) claims that Abbas rejected Olmert’s 2008 proposal because Olmert was already a lame duck at the time.   This theory flies in the face of historical evidence.  Condoleezza Rice writes in her memoirs No Higher Honor that Olmert submitted his proposal in May 2008, and that Abbas told her that he couldn’t tell four million refugees that only five thousand would return home.  In May 2008, Olmert was no lame duck: only on 30 July 2008 did he announce that he would not run for his party’s leadership.  Abbas mentioned to Rice the so-called “right of return,” not Olmert’s legal troubles, to justify his rejection of the proposal.  Al-Jazeera’s “Palestine Papers” revealed that in September 2008, the Palestinian leadership decided not to react officially to the Olmert proposal so as not to be blamed for its failure.  No mention was made of Olmert being a lame duck.

Did Abbas just stay mum about Olmert’s proposal or did he reject it?   Abbas himself answered this question in his interview with Jackson Diehl in The Washington Post on 29 May 2009.  Abbas said in the interview that he turned down Olmert’s proposal.  Not because Olmert was a lame duck, but because, in Abbas’ own words, “the gaps were wide” between what Olmert offered and what Abbas was willing to accept.  Then there is another theory according to which it is Tzipi Livni who told Abbas not to pocket Olmert’s offer because the latter was a lame duck.  But Abbas himself says that this is not the case.  In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat on 22 December 2009, Abbas said the following about the Livni theory: “This did not happen.  No intervention by Tzipi Livni took place.”       

So the lame duck theory doesn’t wash.  Abbas rejected the Olmert proposal because of the “right of return.”

Therefore, Gilead Sher and his acolytes have good reasons to assume that Abbas “might” reject the Olmert proposal again in the theoretical and unlikely scenario of a historical replay.  This is why, according to the INSS paper, Israel should act unilaterally.  Aware of the disastrous security consequences of the 2005 unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, INSS does not suggest a military withdrawal from Judea and Samaria but only a civil one.  In other words, most Israelis living beyond the 1949 armistice line would be deported, but the IDF would retain its presence beyond that line.  According to INSS, such a move will achieve two goals: a. it will preserve Israel’s Jewish majority; b. it will improve Israel’s international image and standing.

Let’s start with the second goal.  As a result of the 2005 unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, Israel was compelled to go to war in December 2008 to stop the shelling of its citizens.  Images of that war were a PR disaster –a disaster that was dwarfed by the ensuing Goldstone Report.  The military naval blockade of Gaza (itself an inevitable consequence of the 2005 withdrawal) caused an international outcry that led to the Marmara incident –another PR waterloo.  So Israel’s international image and standing worsened as a result of the 2005 “disengagement” simply because blockades and bombardments (the side effect of retreating when you live in the Middle East) are more ruinous to your image than military occupation.  Those side effects might be averted by the continuous military presence advocated by INSS in Judea and Samaria.  But then the Palestinians and the world will still accuse Israel of maintaining its “occupation.”  So what’s the point?  Indeed, Israel is still accused of occupying Gaza even though it withdrew its army from there (the military naval blockade is enough for ill-wishers to accuse Israel of being an occupier).

The first rationale of INSS’s proposed disengagement is that, without it, Israel will turn into a bi-national state.  But, as I have explained in a previous article, this is a bogus claim.  Since 2005, Gaza is out of the demographic equation.  Without Gaza, there is a two-third Jewish majority between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.  The demographic trends of the last decade (declining Arab birthrates, increasing Jewish birthrates, Jewish immigration, Arab emigration) suggest that this Jewish majority is stable if not growing.  Whether or not Israel can afford to increase its Arab minority from 20% to 30% is admittedly a question that deserves to be asked and debated, but the “bi-national threat” is a sham.  Indeed, the Sunday Times Middle East correspondent Uzi Mahnaimi recently declared in an interview with Makor Rishon (3 May 2013) that Israel would retain a stable 70% Jewish majority were it to annex Judea and Samaria. 

So the INSS proposal defies logics.  And yet, implementing it seems to be what Benjamin Netanyahu is up to.  While meeting recently with the Foreign Ministry’s staff, Netanyahu said that his commitment to the establishment of a Palestinian state stems from his fear of Israel turning into a “bi-national” country.  Earlier this week, Netanyahu imposed a construction freeze in Judea and Samaria.  But, mostly, Netanyahu has been talking openly about the virtues of referenda, and he is actively working on neutralizing his own Likud party (by taking control of the party’s central committee via a proposed merger with Israel Beitenu, and by replacing primary elections with a top-down appointment system). 

Netanyahu knows that an agreement with the PA is out of reach (especially since Sallam Fayad’s resignation).  He has been caught by the “bi-national” syndrome.  He is freezing settlements.  And he is trying to neutralize his Likud party.  As Bibi likes to say, if it looks like a duck and if it walks like a duck, it’s a duck.

It looks and walks like the 2003 Sharon scenario all over again:  I am just connecting the dots.    

              

Tribute to Maggie

I was a ten year old child growing-up in France when I first heard the name Margaret Thatcher.  Maggie, as she came to be known, had just liberated the Falklands (which French journalists insisted on calling “Les Malouines”).  Mitterrand gave full support to Britain in that war (including vital information on French missiles sold to Argentina), and his feelings toward “La dame de fer” oscillated between admiration and envy (“Je l’admire.  Ou je l’envie?” he confessed to his advisor Jacques Attali).  When it came to economics, however, the socialist President thought he knew better.  He privately derided Thatcher as “a shopkeeper,” echoing Napoléon’s dismissive description of the British as “a nation of shopkeepers.”  As a child, I thought Mitterrand was right.  As an adult, I know he was wrong.

In a way, Britain gave liberalism and conservatism to the world.  John Locke, Adam Smith and David Ricardo were liberals (in the original and British sense of the word) because they believed that there could be no political freedom without economic freedom.  Edmund Burke was a conservative because he doubted the feasibility of Rousseau’s grand social designs and because he firmly believed that no society could function without cherished traditions and shared beliefs. 

Both liberalism and conservatism took a blow in the 20^th century, though.  The economic crisis of the 1930s made people wonder where the “invisible hand” was hiding.  European fascism discredited nationalism.  In post World War Two Europe, economic thought and policy were dominated by Keynesianism, and the political discourse was mostly monopolized by Marxism (“The opium of the intellectuals” as Raymond Aron pointedly spat). 

The 1970s changed the fortunes of the Keynesian and Marxist duopoly.  The enduring “stagflation” put Keynesians on the defensive, and the lowering of trade barriers within the EEC and the GATT turned demand side economics into a “help thy neighbor” policy.  In addition, Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s revelations about the Soviet Gulag embarrassed the European Left.  The time was ripe for liberalism and conservatism to make their case again. 

The task was daunting.  The fact that Keynesianism was no longer delivering and that Marxism’s true colors had been revealed did not produce an overnight Umwertung.  Indeed, Germany’s Willy Brandt was busy appeasing the Soviets with his Ostpolitik, and in France Mitterrand added Communists to his Socialist government.  Liberalism was in need of leadership.  Margaret Thatcher provided it.

When Margaret Thatcher was elected in 1979, the British economy was in decline and the West was in retreat.  In 1979 alone, the West suffered three international humiliations (mostly thanks to Jimmy Carter): the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the Islamic revolution in Iran; and the Sandinista coup in Nicaragua. 

Thatcher faced those challenges by battling for freedom both in economics and in foreign affairs.  Her outlook on economics had been influenced by Friedrich von Hayek and by Milton Friedman.  Her conduct of foreign policy was based on Churchill’s warning that whoever chooses dishonor to avoid war ends up with both dishonor and war. 

Hence did she pass an unpopular budget in 1981 despite calls from within her own party to operate a “u-turn” (“You turn if you want.  The lady is not for turning”).  And hence did she deal with the miners’ 1984-1985 strike with unflinching determination.  Thatcher lowered Britain’s punishing income tax, privatized government-owned behemoths, took away from the unions the power of shutting down the country, and stopped throwing taxpayer money into industrial black holes.  While her reforms put many people out of work in the short run, they lowered unemployment in the long run.  As a result of her policy, Britain has less unemployment and more economic growth than France.  Indeed, London has become a refuge for French entrepreneurs who flee punishing taxes and unaffordable labor laws. 

Her reforms have served as a model of economic liberalization in India, in South America, and in Eastern Europe.  Even Israel’s 1985 economic stabilization program was pure Thatcherism –except for the ironical fact that in Israel Thatcherism was introduced by Shimon Peres while he served as Labor Prime Minister.

Thatcher was also right not to join the Euro.  The European monetary union has become a trap for growth-prone and disciplined countries (Germany, basically) who end-up supporting profligate and irresponsible ones.  Indeed, the Euro is like a dysfunctional couple that wants to separate but is deterred by the cost of divorce.

Thatcher’s foreign policy was also a change for the better.  In lieu of the moral relativism and diplomatic appeasement of the European Left, she proudly proclaimed the moral superiority of democracy and made it clear to tyrants that she was out to get them.  She ordered military action against the Argentinean junta and brushed aside calls for caution and conciliation.  As a result of Britain’s victory, the junta fell and democracy returned to Argentina.  Argentineans may revile Thatcher, but they owe her their freedom.      

She rightly believed that there could be no peace with Russia without a victory over the Soviet regime.  She allowed US nuclear missiles to be stationed in the UK in order to boost the West’s deterrence vis-à-vis Moscow.  She made it clear to Gorbachev that he had to free his country before expecting the West’s largesse.  The Soviet Union may have been doomed to implode, but Thatcher and Reagan decisively accelerated the process that brought the Evil Empire to its knees. 

Thatcher had no patience either for the clownish reincarnations of Saladin.  She supported the bombing of Tripoli in 1986, severed diplomatic ties with Iran in 1989, and convinced George Bush senior to use military force against Saddam Hussein after the invasion of Kuwait.  She stepped down shortly before the Gulf War, but that war might never have been fought if she hadn’t been on board from day one. 

Like everyone else, of course, Thatcher had a less savory side.  Her tolerance for Chile’s Pinochet and for South Africa’s Apartheid government is unforgivable.

But, on balance, she gave back to liberalism and conservatism their lettres de noblesse.  The struggle is far from being over but, thanks to Maggie, it is no longer hopeless.      

The Faith-Keepers

Attending the Herzliya Conference’s panel on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is like following Woody Allen’s therapy through his movies: you know that the patient is hopeless and that the new movie is going to be a mere repetition of the previous one, and yet you maintain the ritual out of snobbism.  This year’s panel, however, was more like a flashback.  I felt like I was watching the ending scene of Mighty Aphrodite, when the Greek tragedy turns into a Broadway show.

The panel included seven speakers: Tzipi Livni (chairperson of the “Hatnuah” party), Shlomo Avineri (a Hebrew-U emeritus professor), Robert Danin (from the US Council on Foreign Relations), Michael Herzog (from the Washington Institute for Near East Policies), Yoaz Hendel (chairman of the Institute for Zionist Strategy), Nati Sharoni (chairman of the Council for Peace and Security), and Dani Dayan (former chairman of the Judea and Samaria Council). The moderator was Barak Ravid, the diplomatic correspondent of Haaretz.

Supposedly, the purpose of a panel is to present different opinions and to have a debate.  In this panel, however, all but one member expressed support for the “two-state solution” (the only minor differences between the speakers were about technicalities).  Even the moderator clearly stated his opinion and sided with the six panelists who expressed their support for the “two-state solution.” The only dissident was Dani Dayan, who was added at the last minute (his name was not on the original program, and an extra seat was squeezed-in for him right before the session started).  In the end, seven speakers (including the “moderator”) said that a Palestinian state must be established in Judea and Samaria, and one speaker begged to differ.  It was a 7-1 ratio, or an 86% majority –an impressive display of pluralism and balance. 

Tzipi Livni (whose party represents 5% of the Knesset) opened her remarks by claiming that she speaks for the majority.  Then she explained why the establishment of a Palestinian state is so urgent: soon Hamas will be in charge and when that happens signing a deal with the Palestinians will no longer be an option.  Is Tzipi Livni aware of her argument’s silliness?  If, as she herself admits, Hamas will eventually take over, what is the point of signing with Fatah today a deal that Hamas will trash tomorrow? But what is telling about Tzipi Livni (and about the “majority” she supposedly represents) is not her comical twisted logic but the way she perceives Israel’s rights.  She said that a peace agreement is the Archimedes’ point of Israel’s existence, and that peace grants legitimacy to Israel.  In other words, Israel’s rights and existence are not sui generis but are only valid if the world (especially Israel’s enemies) approves them. 

Even Ehud Barak said during the Camp David negotiations in July 2000 that the Archimedes’ point of Israel’s existence (he used the very same expression) is the Temple Mount.  For Tzipi Livni, this Archimedes’ point is neither divine nor historical (I suspect Ehud Barak was referring to the second option).  Rather, Israel only has a right to exist if its critics agree to it.  Tzipi Livni has the same “externality” problem on a personal level, which is why she has metamorphosed over the years into the spokesperson of Haaretz.  Precisely because Israel’s self-proclaimed intellectuals will agree to grant you a certificate of intelligence only if you pledge allegiance to the two-state solution, and precisely because Livni is an intellectual lightweight who suffers from an inferiority complex vis-à-vis the branja, she became more royalist than the king.  Tellingly, Shlomo Avineri publicly congratulated her during the “debate” for joining the exclusive club of the enlightened ones after years of darkness in the Likud grotto. 

“Exclusive club” was the expression used by Barak Ravid to describe those who support the two-state solution.  This is typically how the Israeli Left tries to intimidate those who don’t toe the party line: we are the star-belly sneetches.  Then Ravid harangued the audience about what he called “Israel’s Apartheid against the Palestinians” and claimed that, for this “apartheid” to end, a Palestinian state must be established as soon as possible in all of Judea and Samaria.    

Robert Danin castigated the Israeli government for claiming that there is no partner for peace.  When you keep telling people there is no partner, he said, they end up believing it.  Danin didn’t discuss whether or not the PLO is a reliable partner for peace.  His argument was not about history but about psychology: if you can convince people that there is no partner for peace, then you can also convince them that there is a partner for peace.  The truth or falsehood of the argument itself is irrelevant.  What’s important is to believe.  This is precisely why I once wrote an article called “The Two State Religion.”  It’s not about facts.  It’s about faith.

Michel Herzog made a point which I also find fantastic: we have to negotiate with the Palestinians so that we can say to ourselves and to the world that we tried.  Well, what about Camp David in July 2000, what about Taba in December 2000, and what about the Olmert proposal to Abbas in 2008?  Didn’t we try then?  Hasn’t Herzog been around for the past twelve years?

Yoaz Hendel publicly confirmed that he agrees with Tzipi Livni (he had briefly considered running on her list for the 2013 Knesset elections).  He also claimed that “the Israeli people accepts the two-state solution” (actually, over 50 MKs oppose it: 12 MKs from the Jewish Home, 28 MKs from Likud-Beitenu [if you exclude Netanyahu, Tzahi Hanegbi, and maybe Yuval Steinitz], and at least 2/3 of the 18 MKs from the two ultra-orthodox parties). 

Nati Sharoni pledged to “get rid of the occupied territories” and played a short movie by Dror Moreh, the author of The Gatekeepers.  The movie explains (with a soft background music) how to ethnically cleanse Judea and Samaria from its Jews.  

Danny Dayan claimed that a two-state solution is unreachable because the gap is too wide between the maximum that Israel is willing to offer and the minimum that the Palestinians are willing to accept (as proven by Abbas’ rejection of Olmert’s proposal).  He suggested improving the status quo by granting the Palestinians full civil rights under the rule of the Palestinian Authority, while maintaining Israel’s exclusive security prerogatives. 

To which Shlomo Avineri replied that Dayan’s proposal meant denying the Palestinians full national rights, and that this constitutes an injustice.  Finally there was a debate (this was the only interesting part of the panel).  The difference between Shlomo Avineri and Dani Dayan on this issue is not that wide: Avineri doesn’t really believe that a solution is possible, but he wants to keep trying nevertheless.  Dayan really doesn’t believe that there is a solution, and thinks it isn’t worth anyone’s time to keep banging your head against the wall. 

But the debate between the two raised an important question: is it legitimate to grant the Palestinians full civil rights but to deny them national rights?

My answer to this question is positive, for four reasons.

First, because the “Palestinians” do not constitute a genuine people.  They are part of the Arab nation, a nation that has 22 states. 

Second, because the Palestinian narrative is a fraud and because the Archimedes’ point (to use that expression again) of “Palestinism” is the destruction of Israel.

Third, because the Palestinians openly admit that they won’t tolerate any Jewish minority in the “Palestinian state” (by contrast, there is a significant Arab minority in the Jewish state). 

Fourth, because such a state would inevitably be militarized, it would incite its population (as the PA currently does) against Israel and the Jews, it would eventually be run by Hamas, and it would be an ally of Israel’s worst enemies (especially Iran).

So, yes, there are very good reasons to grant the Palestinian Arabs full civil rights but to deny them national rights.

As the panel was coming to an end, Barak Ravid tried very hard to find out if Netanyahu might actually take concrete steps toward the establishment of a Palestinian state (the dream of the Israeli Left).  Shlomo Avineri said he didn’t think so because of Netanyahu’s “revisionist” upbringing.

Referring to Netanyahu, Avineri said the following: “Beware of people who are true believers, because true believers never admit that they are wrong.”

Well said, professor.  You obviously didn’t realize that you were unintentionally ridiculing the “two-state” believers such as yourself.  But I had a good laugh: thank you for turning the Greek tragedy into a Broadway show.      

  

Countdown to the Sixth Intifada

The death of Arafat Jaradat in an Israeli jail has raised the fear of a “third intifada.”  But if a new intifada were indeed to erupt, it would not be the third.  It would be the sixth.

Historically, intifadas have always followed the same pattern: a. the Palestinian leadership comes-up with a lie and deliberately inflames its population; b. once the violence turns lethal, the Palestinian leadership claims it had nothing to do with it; c. the international community steps it, explaining that in order to stop the violence Israel must address the Palestinians’ justified anger and legitimate claims; d. the Palestinian leadership gets from Israel what it failed to obtain at the negotiation table.  It always works, so why not keep going?  

The first intifada erupted in 1929, when Hadj-Amin al-Husseini spread the lie (with doctored pictures) that the Jews were planning to overtake the Al-Aqsa mosque in order to rebuild their temple.  Al-Husseini used violence because he had failed to convince the British to halt Jewish immigration and land purchases.  The violence he ignited was lethal: 133 Jews were killed, and the Jewish community of Hebron was decimated.  But the strategy worked: in October 1930, Sir John Hope Simpson’s report cleared the Mufti of any responsibility for the violence, and it agreed to curb Jewish immigration.  Al-Husseini realized that this was the way to go, so he kept going.

Al-Husseini launched a second intifada in 1936.  He wanted the British to repeal the League of Nations mandate and establish an Arab state instead of a “Jewish National Home.”  This time, some 400 Jews were killed.  Again, it worked: the Peel Commission (1937) recommended the de facto cancellation of the League of Nations mandate, and the establishment of a mini Jewish state in the Galilee as well as on a narrow strip between Tel-Aviv and Haifa.  Al-Husseini rejected the offer, however, and intensified the violence.  The British made him a better offer still with the 1939 White Paper, which further curbed Jewish immigration and purchasing rights.  

Yasser Arafat, who more than once described al-Husseini as his hero and his model, used the very same tactics.  On December 8, 1987, an Israeli truck driver accidentally killed four bystanders in Gaza.  Although this was a road accident, the PLO decided to spread the lie that it was a deliberate murder.  This is how the third intifada (generally and inaccurately known as the “first intifada”) started.  Some 200 Israelis were killed.  As a result, Israel agreed (in the Oslo Accords) to give the PLO a foothold in the Gaza Strip and in Jericho.  Within twenty years, Arafat had managed to implement the PLO’s “phased plan” adopted in Cairo in 1974.  

After the 1996 Israeli elections, Arafat decided to launch a fourth intifada in order to have the international community twist the arm of Israel’s new government.  This time, the lie spread by Arafat was that Israel was causing the Al-Aqsa Mosque to collapse.  In September 1996, the Israeli government opened the northern exit of the Hasmonean tunnel so that visitors wouldn’t have to walk back to the entrance at the end of their tour.  The opening had been coordinated with the Waqf, which was given permission to build a huge mosque in Solomon’s Stables.  In spite of this deal, Arafat decided to spread violence by calling upon the Palestinians to “protect the a-Aqsa Mosque” (he claimed that Israel had dug a tunnel under the Al-Aqsa Mosque, when in fact Israel had only opened another exit to a tunnel that had been there for 2000 years and that does not run under the Al-Aqsa Mosque).  Again, it worked: President Bill Clinton intervened and decided to meet Arafat’s political demands.  The result?  The 1997 Hebron Agreement, in which Israel agreed to withdraw from the City of the Patriarchs.

Then came the fifth intifada in September 2000, which killed over 1,000 Israelis.  This intifada was not ignited by one lie, but two: Ariel Sharon’s visit on the Temple Mount was a provocation (in fact, Prime Minister Ehud Barak had informed Arafat of the visit and had coordinated the timing with him), and Israel had assassinated a child at the Netzarim junction in Gaza (in reality, the “killing” of Mohamed al-Dura had been staged and filmed by Palestinian cameraman Talal abu-Rahmah).  Arafat and Bargouti had planned the fifth intifada for a long time, and when it became clear at Camp David in July 2000 that Israel was not going to give in on the “right of return,” Arafat played the old “Al-Husseini trick.”  It worked, as always.  The PLO obtained more Israeli concessions at the Taba Talks and with the Clinton parameters.  Most significantly, the fifth intifada achieved two major goals: for the first time, a US president (George W. Bush) and an Israeli prime minister (Ariel Sharon) openly declared that they agreed to the establishment of a Palestinian state (Road Map, 2003), and for the first time Israel dismantled settlements in an area claimed by the PLO (Disengagement plan, 2005).  

If it always works, why not keep going?  This is why a sixth intifada is quite likely ahead of President Obama’s visit to Israel.  Abbas’ main objective is to get his terrorists out of Israeli jails, and the recipe will be the same: a. make-up a lie; b. get mad at your own lie and threaten to get madder if you don’t get your way; c. make the world believe that the whole fuss will end the moment Israel gives in; d. repeat the operation every ten to twenty years. 

Since the last intifada ended eight years ago, we should expect another round soon, according to the recipe.       

Mali: An Opportunity for Israel

France intervened in Mali to protect its vital interests. For years, al-Qaeda has been trying to overtake the countries of the Sahel region, and Mali is its main target. Without the French military intervention, Mali would have become the first Islamic state of the Sahel region, followed by neighboring Niger, a country on which France heavily depends for its uranium imports. Yet, by defending its interests, France has opened a diplomatic opportunity for Israel.  

Mali’s interim President Dioncounda Traoré had very harsh words for the Arab members of the African Union on the closing day of the organization’s summit in Addis Ababa on January 27, 2013. Addressing the Arab states that had condemned France’s air attacks against the Islamists – such as Egypt and Tunisia – Traoré questioned their refusal to condemn the horrific actions inflicted by the Islamists on the people of Mali, but willingness to express outrage against a French intervention.
 
Mali’s political leaders and opinion-makers openly express their feeling of betrayal by the Arab countries, especially those run by Islamist regimes; after cutting ties with Israel under Arab pressure, they expected those same Arab states to aid them in their fight against the Islamists. Instead, the Arab countries condemned France, not the Islamists. A recent article in the Malian daily Le Matin directed its critique specifically at the Palestinians and their ambassador to Mali, Abu Rabah. In addition to being the PLO’s ambassador, Abu Rabah is the head of Mali’s diplomatic protocol. He is ubiquitous in the media and has managed to put the “Palestinian cause” on top of Mali’s national agenda – including the naming of a public square in Bamako, Mali’s capital, after the “Palestinian Martyr” Mohamed al-Dura. Yet Abu Rabah did not have a single word to say against the Islamists. Le Matin not only lashed out at Abu Rabah, it claimed that the Islamists are backed by the Arab and Muslim countries. Since Mali has been duped by its so-called Muslim brethren, Le Matin concluded, it should change its foreign policy.

Mali’s feeling of betrayal is reminiscent of Africa’s disappointment in the Arab and Muslim world in the 1970s, when Libya and Saudi Arabia tried to use financial incentives to encourage African countries to cut ties with Israel. After the Yom Kippur War, the Arab League threatened to apply its oil embargo to Africa. As a result, all African countries (except Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, and Swaziland) severed their ties with Israel. But they soon realized that their move had no benefit, and that the Arab League was willing to share its enemies but not its oil. More and more African leaders and opinion-makers openly charged the Arabs of racism, reminding them of their past slavery trade in Africa. They were also concerned by Muammar Gaddafi’s expansionist and destabilizing policies.  

In the 1980s, Israel proactively re-engaged Africa under the leadership of Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and Foreign Ministry Director-General David Kimche. Most African countries restored their ties with Israel in the 1980s and 1990s. However, some African states changed course in the following decade. Niger severed its diplomatic relations with Israel in 2000 at the outbreak of the Second Intifada, and Mauritania in 2009, after Israel’s military operation in Gaza. Both countries are Muslim, and both were influenced by Iran.  

In 2008, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared that his country intended to develop ties with Africa. One year later, he visited many African countries with Iranian diplomats and generals, signing commercial, diplomatic, and defense deals. Israel lost a project of water sewage in Senegal after Iran promised to carry out the same work at lower cost. Iran’s influence in Africa also relies on Lebanon’s rich and influential diaspora in countries such as Congo, Guinea, and Senegal, which donates money to Hizballah.  

However, with the electoral victory of Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia, and with the nearly takeover of Mali by al-Qaeda, more and more African countries are becoming fearful of Iran and of its Islamist allies. Ethiopia, forced to confront Islamist militias backed by nearby rebels in Somalia, has become one of Israel’s closest allies in Africa, as well as a major buyer of Israeli defense equipment. Kenya, which also faces Islamist terrorism from neighboring Somalia, is interested in strengthening its military ties with Israel. Even Nigeria reportedly spent about $500 million on Israeli military equipment in the past few years.

Mali’s anger at Arab countries, especially Egypt, is part of a wider African fear of Islamic influence and of Iranian meddling on the continent. Even though France’s military intervention in Mali is only meant to serve French interests, it opens a window of opportunity which Israel should seize to improve its relations with Africa and with France itself.

French military strikes against Mali’s Islamists are in stark contrast with France’s backing of the Muslim rebels in Côte d’Ivoire during that country’s civil war in 2002-2011. There, President Laurent Gbagbo, a Christian, started challenging France’s strong economic grip over his country. His defiant policy created a community of interests between France and Côte d’Ivoire’s Muslim rebels led by Alassane Ouattara. Hence did France support the Muslim rebels from Côte d’Ivoire’s northern region against Gbagbo and the Christian south. The embattled Ivorian president, a close friend of Israel, sought and obtained Israel’s logistical help. France and Israel ended up confronting each other by proxy in Côte d’Ivoire. In April 2011, then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy ordered a French military commando to oust Gbagbo from his bunker, allowing Ouattara to take the presidency.

While France and Israel collided in Côte d’Ivoire, the policy of President François Hollande in Mali creates a new community of interests, since France is now fighting forces that are hostile to Israel. Thus, the Malian crisis constitutes an opportunity for Israel to improve its relations with France and with former French colonies in Africa. This opportunity should be seized by Israel’s next foreign minister.

Endorsing Realism

Israeli elections hardly offer a chance to replace governments.  This is because the Left is doomed to lose elections and because the Right is doomed to be denied victory.

The Left had a stable majority in the Knesset between 1949 and 1977.  Since then, the majority in the Knesset has gradually switched to the Right.  The Labor Party shared power with Likud between 1984 and 1990 and was able to run a narrow government between 1992 and 1996 as well as short-lived one between 1999 and 2001.  But the likeliness of a Labor-led collation has nearly faded.

This historical change is mostly due to demographics: over the years, Israeli society has become more conservative, more oriental, and more religious.  In a way, a Labor Prime Minister in Israel has become as unlikely as a Republican President in America for similar reasons: immigration and demography have dethroned WASP domination in both countries (White Anglo-Saxon Protestants in America, White Ashkenazi Sabra Paratroopers in Israel).  

Precisely because it has chronically lost its electoral base, the Israeli Left has jealously maintained its grip over powers that are beyond voters’ reach: The Supreme Court, the civil service, the media, and academia.  The nomination mechanism of Supreme Court Justices perpetuates ideological continuity, and the High Court of Justice repeals laws that do not meet its liberal standards (such laws are officially dismissed as unconstitutional despite the fact that Israel still lacks a formal Constitution).  The State Attorney’s office typically refuses to take orders from its boss (the Government) and to defend it in Court.  The political narrative of Israel’s opinion-makers, both from the media and from academia, is highly monolithic.  So the Right might have the upper-hand electorally, but it is mostly unable to implement the will of its voters.  

The separation of powers in Israel is quite different from the one Montesquieu had envisioned.  In effect, there is a separation of powers between, on the one hand, a Legislature and a Government that are generally run by the Right and, on the other hand, a Judiciary as well as an intellectual leadership that are dominated by the Left. 

The chances of new parties to challenge this status quo are slim.  In 1977, respected academics and public figures established the “Dash” party to provide an alternative to the discredited Labor leadership and to reform Israel’s political system.  Dash did fairly well in the 1977 elections, but it failed to have an impact on Israeli politics.  It vanished after four years.  Two decades later, Tommy Lapid led the pro-market and liberal “Shinui” party to electoral victory.  But after Lapid’s stint as Justice Minister, Shinui evaporated just like Dash.  Tommy Lapid’s son, Yair, is now following his father’s steps with the “Yesh Atid” party.  Like Shinui, Yesh Atid aspires to improve the lot of a struggling middle class.

Like its predecessors, Yesh Atid has sensible ideas and a commendable program, especially on electoral reform.  But why assume that it will succeed where its precursors have failed?

The reason why outsider parties have so far been unable to challenge the status quo is that reforming Israel’s political system is a catch 22.  You need a majority to pass electoral reform into law, but such a majority has never coalesced because small parties will not vote for a reform that will eliminate them, and because large parties fear to upset their junior coalition partners, whom they need to stay in power.  

The only way to reform Israel’s electoral system is for large parties to get together and defy the threats and blackmail of the small and religious parties.  Such an opportunity existed during the short-lived coalition between Netanyahu and Mofaz a few months ago.  Unfortunately, this opportunity has been missed.  

The only coalition that could advance electoral reform is a coalition between Likud-Israel Beitenu, Yesh Atid, and the Jewish Home –a coalition that would exclude the ultra-orthodox parties.  Such a coalition would be similar to the one formed by Sharon in 2003.  The same way that the 2003 coalition enabled the government to pass the necessary budget cuts, a similar coalition ten years later might make it possible, for the first time, to reform Israel’s political system.

A government led by Netanyahu, Bennet and Lapid would also pursue a responsible economic policy and lower the cost of housing.  Such a government will continue to manage the unsolvable conflict with the Palestinians: Netanyahu will continue to give good speeches around the world, Lapid will say that he’d love to solve the conflict but that conditions are not ripe, and Bennet’s semi-annexation plan will be shelved.  Tzipi Livni will continue to claim that she could have solved the Arab-Israeli conflict had she been given another chance, and Shelly Yahimowich will continue to preach the virtues of socialism. 

For such a coalition to hold, however, Likud-Beitenu would need 40 seats, while Bennet and Lapid would need over 10 seats each.  This scenario is not unlikely according to the polls, provided that Likud-Beitenu convinces more voters that it deserves their votes.  But for this to happen, Likud’s leadership needs to clearly state that it intends to form the next coalition with Yesh Atid and the Jewish Home, and without the ultra-orthodox –a coalition whose three main targets will be to implement electoral reform, to maintain economic growth through a fairer share of the economic burden, and to pursue its relatively successful management of the unsolvable conflict with the Palestinians.